Grace in the CoW?
Posted on 30. Sep, 2009 by Mark Jones in Thomas Goodwin
Was the covenant of works gracious in any way? Or should we talk about “divine favor” instead of grace? I’ve heard some Klineans argue that if you reject a “strict justice” view of the covenant of works you inevitably end up doing irreperable harm to the doctrine of justification by faith. Theologians in the Reformed tradition have never been shy of speaking of grace during the “Adamic administration” or what one person calls the “covenant of works” (do I have that backwards?)
Francis Roberts wrote the longest work on covenant theology in the seventeenth century and his thoughts on grace in the covenant of works are interesting. He argues that God’s entering into the covenant of works with Adam was an “act of divine grace and favour, not of debt” (God’s Covenants, 23).
God could have dealt only in terms of “command”, requiring duty from Adam without a reward. However, because he condescended to Adam and entered into a covenant with him, it was “meer grace” (Ibid). Roberts insists that Adam could not merit any reward. In fact, even if Adam had rendered perfect obedience he would still have “been an unprofitable servant, having done nothing but what was duty” (Ibid). On account of Creation, Adam owed God obedience. On account of God instituting a covenant at creation, Adam had to be “double dutiful” (Ibid). In fact, Roberts suggests that if God’s dealings with Adam in the covenant of works was an “Act of Divine Grace”, then God’s covenant of grace was an act of “superabounding and transcendent grace” (Ibid).
What is interesting is that Thomas Goodwin takes a rather different approach than Roberts, which is yet more evidence of the diversity among theologians in the Reformed tradition. Sure, the covenant of works became firmly entrenched in our confessional tradition, but the details of the covenant of works have never been fully agreed upon.
Goodwin calls the estate into which man was born the estate of pure nature by “creation law”. He recognizes that “our divines” rightly call it the Foedus Naturae, the Covenant of Nature (Goodwin also uses the term “covenant of works”). This covenant is “founded upon an equitable intercourse set up between God the Creator, and his intelligent unfallen creatures, by virtue of the Law.” We, as creatures, are therefore bound to deal with God according to that bond and obligation which is a result of the imago Dei.
Interestingly, Goodwin prefers, instead of “the covenant of works/nature”, the term “The Creation Law, Jus Creationis“. In other words, “of what was equitable between God, considered merely as Creator, on one part; and his intelligent Creatures that were endued with understanding and will, on the other, simply considered as such creatures.” This “law” between the Creator and creatures “lay in an equitable transaction between God and them, a congruity, dueness, meetness, on either part.”
Since God is Creator it became him to do for his creatures what was worthy of the Creator-creature relationship. He was under no obligation to exceed what his position required as a Creator. He gave all that was due for his creatures to attain their end of happiness because, as Creator, “his will regulated itself by what was meet for their (the creatures) Natures, as such, to receive from him, and for him as a Creator to give.”
During the pre-Fall administration, God bestowed “such faculties and powers, as the creature itself could any way judge requisite to his performing the work of a creature of an intelligent Nature.” Specifically, then, when God created Adam and Eve, it became him to endow them with his own image of holiness “whereby they might be able to know, to love, and to enjoy a Communion with him … as their chiefest good.” Moreover, on God’s part, as a Creator, he was bound to continue his favor and goodness to Adam and Eve if they would remain in their estate of holiness.
Hence, the promise, “if you do these things, you will live”, was their life on account of “creation dues” and “an equity by creation law”. (All quotes from “Of the Creatures, and their Condition”, Works, 1691-1704, vol. II:20-21.)
Goodwin continues by asserting that though God bound himself to certain “dues” to his creatures, by virtue of his being, he was not obliged to preserve his creature in their state of innocence. Importantly, Goodwin argues that we must not lay upon God any blame for the Fall (James 1:13-14). God stands free; it is “not upon prerogative, but Equity, that he is a Debtor unto Man.” God was at perfect liberty to give or not to give what he had not compacted for.
Of course, Goodwin argued in this same work that Adam’s reward could not have been heavenly life; only Christ could merit such blessings.
Finally, regarding grace in the covenant of works, Thomas Boston says that “it was certainly an act of grace, favour, and admirable condescension in God, to enter into a covenant, and such a covenant, with his own creature.” For Boston, man was still bound to obey, perfectly, before the covenant “in virtue of his natural dependence on God.” Man could not have “required eternal life as a reward of his work” before the covenant. The entering into the covenant was itself an act of grace. However, once the covenant had been instituted, man “may crave the reward on the ground of the covenant.” (T. Boston, The Complete Works of the Late Rev. Thomas Boston, 12 Vols. (1853; repr., Wheaton, IL: Richard Owen Roberts, Publishers, 1980), VIII:18-19).
The Scot, Hugh Binning, describes grace in the covenant of works in the following way:
there were some outbreakings of the glorious grace and free condescendency of God; for it was no less free grace and undeserved favour to promise life to his obedience, than now to promise life to our faith. So that if the Lord had continued that covenant with us, we ought to have called it grace, and would have been saved by grace as well as now (Common Principles of Christian Relg., lec. 6).
There are, of course, a number of issues that need to be discussed in relation to what has been said. There are important reasons, both theological and exegetical, why the majority of Reformed theologians have spoken of grace in the covenant of works; and, as you well know, there are reasons why a small minority (very, very small) have resisted the language of grace in the Adamic administration.
So, you see, there are some real points of disagreement on this issue, and I haven’t even touched on Adam’s reward, which was either continued life in Eden or the reward of heaven. Important Christological issues are connected with this issue!
23 Responses to “Grace in the CoW?”
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Joel Fick
30. Sep, 2009
When Dr. Kline objected to grace in the Cov. of Works, he was objecting to “grace” as the principle of inheritance with respect to the reward. He did not necessarily object to the idea of grace in God’s condescending to enter into covenant, but he did feel that it was confusing to use the same term (grace) to speak both of God’s condescending to enter into the covenant with man (which he felt was the act of creating man himself, man never having existed outside of a covenantal relationship), and as a term to describe the “de-merited favor” we receive after the fall. That is why he preferred to speak of simple justice as the principle of inheritance operative in the Cov. of Works.
Danny Hyde
30. Sep, 2009
Mark, I think it is helpful for us to make a distinction in speaking of God’s “grace.” Whether we call the distinction between “common” and “redemptive” doesn’t matter to me; what matters is that there is a recognition that the grace of God in the state of innocency apart from sin is different than the grace of God in the state of sin. Carl Trueman and i had this discussion once over a pint of Guinness.
In prepping my notes for my sermon this Sunday evening on Genesis 1:26–2:25 in connection with Westminster Larger Catechism, Q&A 20, I came across the following. In Thomas Watson’s exposition of the Shorter Catechism’s parallel Q&A (12), it’s interesting that he speaks of both justice and grace in this covenant, even saying, “God gave him [Adam] a stock of grace to trade with, but by his own neglect he failed” (A Body of Divinity, Banner of Truth, 129). In speaking of the abundant blessings of providence God gave Adam, Watson said, “Paradise was not more adorned with fruit than Adam’s soul was with grace” (A Body of Divinity 130).
Mark Jones
30. Sep, 2009
Joel,
Thank you for your comment. I hope you don’t mind me throwing back at you a few of my own comments, particularly since you seem like a guy who can answer some questions for me from a Klinean perspective.
So, here goes:
I don’t think this is simply an issue of “confusion”. In other words, this isn’t only a terminological issue.
Kline and Lee Irons have used some strong language, with Irons going so far to say that the mention of grace in the CoW is a “polluted source” that influenced Reformed theology. Did not Kline accuse Dabney, among others, of rejecting the gospel? If that is true – I’ll have to re-check my sources – I don’t see how that type of language is helpful.
Tell me, what specifically about our history of using grace to describe the CoW is so polluted?
Is Kline not being revisionistic with his understanding of what grace is and what merit is?
And, if you are feeling generous, does Kline acknowledge that Adam possessed the Holy Spirit, which enabled him to obey God?
For all the heat that John Murray receives for his so-called re-casting, Kline makes far more revisions than Murray does, in my opinion.
Mark
PS, Danny, agreed. I don’t question that grace in the pre-Fall and post-Fall contexts is different. But God’s reward to Adam was gracious, in my opinion, and not a only a matter of justice. There are a lot of Christological issues wrapped up in this, but I’d be interested (privately) in what our friend, Carl, had to say!
Joel Fick
01. Oct, 2009
Mark,
First, I hope my comment was not taken as an attack. It was not intended as such. Second, I don’t mind the questions, but neither do I have time to engage in a long discussion of the matter. And I won’t pretend to respond for Kline or Irons. So I’ll just respond as best as I can and then let you have the last word. So taking the questions in order…
First, I have no idea if Kline accused Dabney of rejecting the gospel, but it’s is a lofty charge to float into cyberspace apart from documentation. Caution and prudence suggest re-checking the sources.
I’ll not ask you to defend Dabney or answer for him, but I have found his formulations troubling at points. Especially when he suggests that God accepts Christ’s obedience as “in his mercy he sees fit,” rather than as a satisfaction of his perfect justice.
“Nor would we attach any force to the argument, that if Christ made penal satisfaction for the sins of all, justice would forbid any to be punished. To urge this argument surrenders virtually the very ground on which the first Socinian objection was refuted, and is incompatible with the facts that God chastises justified believers, and holds elect unbelievers subject to wrath till they believe. Christ’s satisfaction is not a pecuniary equivalent, but only such a one as enables the Father, consistently with His attributes, to pardon, if in His mercy He sees fit. The whole avails of the satisfaction to a given man is suspended on his belief. There would be no injustice to the man, if he remaining an unbeliever, his guilt were punished twice over, first in his Savior, and then in him” (Lectures on Systematic Theology, p. 521).
In my opinion, apart from the questions regarding the extent of the atonement that are raised here, Dabney’s easy rejection of merit with respect to the second and last Adam may be the logical fruit of his rejection of merit with the first Adam. To say that there is no injustice in punishing guilt twice over, is a difficult pill to swallow.
Second, I was unsure from your comment if that “polluted source” comment was a direct quote or something from a personal conversation. In any respect I always find it difficult to answer for someone else.
So again I’ll just throw in my own two cents. I’m not sure you were suggesting it, but I don’t think “our history” is uniform on the matter of ascribing grace to the CoW. I do appreciate Boston’s insight that once man is in covenant with God he may “crave the reward on the ground of the covenant.” I appreciate it because it defines and conditions both the merit and the reward in terms of the covenant itself. In my mind that is helpful. If God promises a certain reward for a certain act, no matter how disproportionate the reward is to the act required, it is an expression of his justice (covenantally revealed and defined) to bestow the reward for the obedience offered. It is a good and kind favor to be sure to enter into such an arrangement (which we may call grace in one sense), but once he binds himself to the covenant arrangement, the gift or reward can never be called a gift of grace in the same sense that it is called a gift of grace in Romans 5. There must be some distinguishing between the pre-lapsarian/covenant-entering/creating favor of God and that post-lapsarian/re-creating de-merited favor of God (which you PS’d Danny you agreed with). Where I quibble with Boston, and others, is that I believe Adam never existed outside of covenant with God. That “special act of providence” having been the first act of providence with respect to man, or better yet his having been created a covenantal creature. It seems to me that if we define sin biblically as “a transgression of the law” or “any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God” we are necessarily defining sin in covenantal terms. But perhaps this is beyond the scope of the question.
Third, in my opinion it is an unfair comparison to say that Kline’s refining of the notion of grace before and after the fall while maintaining and defending the overall CoW/CoG paradigm is of the same magnitude as Murray’s outright denial of the CoW/CoG pardigm and his assertion that the CoW (or Adamic Administration to use his term) was not in any sense a covenantal “contract or compact” (The Adamic Administration, Collected Writings p.50). This of course stems from his redefining of covenant as “a sovereign administration of grace and promise” (Covenant of Grace, p.31). Above all, I think it is helpful to note that Murray saw this as a self-conscious act of reconstructing covenant theology on his part. “We would not presume to claim that we shall be so successful in this task that the reconstruction will displace and supersede the work of the classic covenant theologians” (Covenant of Grace, p.5).
Murray has much to commend him, and is happily inconsistent (unlike Dabney) when it comes to the merit of the Last Adam. But I do think that his re-formulation with respect to the CoW is a reconstruction for the worse and not for the better.
In the Grace of Christ,
Joel
Mark Jones
01. Oct, 2009
Joel,
Thanks. The references you asked for are:
“polluted source”: L. Irons, “Redefining Merit: An Examination of Medieval Presuppositions in Covenant Theology,” in Creator Redeemer Consummator: A Festschrift for Meredith G. Kline, ed. H. Griffith and J. Muether (Greenville, SC: Reformed Academic Press, 2000), 262.
It was actually Bill Baldwin who made the comments about Dabney endangering the gospel. “Several Quick Arguments that the Covenant of Works is not Gracious.” But I may yet still find Kline’s reference.
I don’t want to go down rabbit trails with Dabney and the atonement. My concern in this discussion has to do with whether Reformed theologians were right to speak about grace in the covenant of works.
Dabney seems to be reflecting the tradition when he writes:
“God’s act in entering into a covenant with Adam, if it be substantiated, will be found to be one of pure grace and condescension. He might justly have held him always under his natural relationship; and Adam´s obedience, however long continued, would not have brought God into his debt for the future.”
The issue of grace is, of course, connected to the idea of merit. Reformed theologians have historically rejected the concept of merit (in any form), and that is why they were happy to speak of grace. Kline abandons grace and can therefore speak of merit. This is a significant revision of Reformed theology!
We’ll have to disagree on Adam. To my knowledge, most Reformed theologians feel he was made *for* a covenant and not *in* a covenant. I think Cocceius was right on this point.
I know I threw a lot of questions at you – again, my apologies – but how we define grace is the crux of the issue. The Reformed tradition typically defined it as “unmerited favor”; but Kline seems to define it as “ill-merited favor”. I just don’t think the Scriptures define grace that way.
Since you and I are obviously very busy, could you just let me know if Kline speaks about the assistance of the Holy Spirit in Adam’s obedience? I would be very interested in the answer to that question.
Blessings,
Mark
Joel Fick
01. Oct, 2009
Mark,
Sorry for passing over the question regarding Adam and the Holy Spirit. I was moving quickly. I guess the short answer is I’m not entirely sure how he would answer. Nevertheless, I’ll give it a stab (with the caveat that I’m not entirely sure).
From my reading of Kline, most of his discussion of the Spirit’s relation to Adam is as the Archetype image in which he is created and designated the son of God. The imitation of God principle, not just as the indicative of his being but as the imperative covenantal law of creation “to be like God” is of utmost importance for Kline.
Since Kline always seeks to maintain the parallel between the two Adams and since the last Adam is endowed and anointed with the Spirit for the performance of his task as the Messianic Servant/Son, I see no reason why Kline would object to the Spirit’s assistance in fulfilling the terms of the CoW. His disobedience being the proto-grieving of the Spirit.
I do think however that Kline would likely say that Adam’s reception of the Spirit in creation would yet be consummated in fullness in a glorification beyond probation had he fulfilled the terms of the CoW. The life offered as a reward in the CoW being that eternal life in the Spirit symbolized in the Sabbatical sign. This finding its counterpart in the Last Adam’s consummate investiture with the Spirit at his resurrection.
Not sure if that’s what you’re after, but those are my thoughts.
Grace and Peace,
Joel
alan
01. Oct, 2009
Interesting post, Mark. Your point about diversity on this matter in the reformded tradition seems appropriate. Some contempoary writers in our tradition argue vehemently against the term grace with reference to the covenant of works, usually those sympathetic to Kline’s thought. Yet as I read more and more of the older writers on this matter it seems most of them argue along the lines of Roberts as you’ve cited him above. Most also seem to argue against the idea of Adam’s reward as being strictly meritorious.
I like Bavinck’s formulation on the latter subject, that Adam’s reward would not have been meritorious in any way:
“There is no such thing as merit in the existence of a crature before God,nor can there be since the relation between the Creator and a creature radically and once and for all eliminates any notion of merit. this true after the fall but NO LESS BEFORE THE FALL. Then too human being were creatures: without entitlements, eithout rights, without merit.” (In The Beginning, p.205, emphasis mine).
He goes on a few sentences later to state that “Every creaturely right is a given benefit, a gift of grace, undeserved and nonobligatory. All reward from the side of God originates in grace; no merit, either of condignity or of congruity , is possible.”
Elsewhere, though I can’t spot the reference now, I think he refered to Adam’s reward under that covenant as a reward not of merit but flowing as a reward from the terms of the covenant, i.e., as a reward promised by God the Creator for his obedience.
alan
01. Oct, 2009
Just another thought on the ‘Murray is a bad reformed theologian’ idea. Having read his ‘Imputation of Adam’s Sin’ some 25 years ago, I can hardly think of a more robust view of the covenantal idea of Adam’s federal headship than expressed there, with his strong defense of immediate imputation. Most contemporary presbyterian preachers so soft-pedal the idea of original sin when discussing Gen.3 or Rom.5 that I sometimes wonder if they really believe it. Personal sin is what usually gets emphasized. And Dabney thought the idea of immeditate imputation outlandish, if I recall.
Also, if reformed people are going to beat up on Murray, I wonder why they are so silent on people like Longman who still claim to be in the reformed tradition and can’t make up their mind whether Adam was really a historical individual or not. The Longman/Enns disciples don’t even think it matters whether Abraham was really a historical person or not. No historical Adam, no covenant of works. Period. Now that seems like a dog worth barking at!
Joel Fick
01. Oct, 2009
I agree with Alan that “The Imputation of Adam’s Sin” is one of the best defenses of Federal headship there is. Also Redemption Accomplished & Applied is a simple and marvelous statement of Reformed soteriology. My comments above were not intended to beat up on Mr. Murray (I have his picture on my Study wall), I just disagree with his formulation of the CoW.
alan
01. Oct, 2009
Joel,
Wasn’t referring to your posts. Just to Murray bashing in general. Your’s were sensible and irenic enough. Thanks for your perspective.
Alan
Patrick
02. Oct, 2009
Mark,
You should check out Ligon Duncan’s discussion of this in Vol. 3 of WCF into the 21st Century, 487-488. He doesn’t want to use the word ‘grace’ wrt to the CW.
Mark Jones
02. Oct, 2009
Oh, really … how fascinating. I’ll have to get that volume. Generally I find those volumes contain the good, the bad, and the ugly. What are your thoughts on the quality of his argument?
MJ
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Lee Irons
05. Oct, 2009
If you look at my “polluted source” quote in context you’ll see that I wasn’t referring to the notion of grace in the covenant of works, but to the pactum theology of medieval scholasticism, specifically, the medieval distinction between condign and congruous merit. I wrote:
“The logic of the Confession’s opening statement on the covenants contains more than a faint echo of the medieval via moderna. In his effort to determine the scholastic roots and precursors of the Reformed covenant theology Stephen Strehle confirms this connection. He concludes that the Reformed were deeply influenced by Franciscan voluntarism and its attendant pactum theology … Although we are grateful to our Reformed forefathers for the overall covenant scheme they have bequeathed to us, we must ask ourselves whether some of the details of that scheme may have come from a polluted source. Have we gone far enough in our covenantal thinking? Or do we still harbor ontological presuppositions regarding justice and merit? Is the distinction between condign and congruous merit helpful? Is it legitimate to take a distinction, which in its original formulation was part and parcel of the Semi-Pelagian drift of the late medieval church, and apply it to pre-fall covenantal arrangements?” (“Redefining Merit,” in the Festschrift for Meredith Kline, pp. 261-62).
I think when read in context is clear that “the polluted source” I am referring to is not Reformed theology but late medieval Semi-Pelagian pactum theology.
Also, I would like to add that I have always acknowledged that the mainstream Reformed tradition has been to see an element of grace and voluntary condescension in the pre-fall covenant of works. I freely grant that Kline’s view is in the minority (held by only a few, such as Witsius and Heidegger). For this reason, I would never argue that those who hold the gracious view are outside the pale or should be denied ordination.
After all, it is those of us who hold Kline’s view who must take exception to WCF VII.1 (“voluntary condescension”), not the other way around.
By the same token, I do think Kline’s view does a better job of bringing clarity to the Adam-Christ typology and showing the parallelism between the merit of Adam and the merit of Christ. Kline’s entire motive was to highlight the clarity of the gospel truth that we are saved by the merit of Christ as the second Adam. Why, then, is it so strongly railed against?
Rowland Ward
07. Oct, 2009
Hi Lee. Good to read your comment.
Covenant theology had developed its main lines by the 1640s but there were differences of approach and the WCF is not itself fully consistent. It would be another generation before greater maturity in formulation, and even today there is no reason to nthink we can’t secure better insight.
I’ve certainly not read Witsius as if he were in effect Kilinean in respect to merit in the CoW. Can you elaborate?
Mark Jones
07. Oct, 2009
Hi, Guys,
I’m in Holland right now (can’t write much) and discussed this last night with Willem van Asselt. He is surprised by Kline’s view, as I suspect most Post-Reformation scholars would be.
The big issue is Kline’s redefinition of concepts such as grace and merit. I simply don’t think you can equate Kline with Witsius; Kline is sui generis. But, then again, I don’t think Kline’s form of republication is at all the same as the type (pardon the pun) you find in the 17thC.
If Kline’s move was to highlight the clarity of gospel truth I don’t see why his formulations/redefinitions were all that necessary.
Cheers,
Mark
Lee Irons
07. Oct, 2009
Hi Rowland! Here are the quote showing that Kline was not the first Reformed theologian to question whether the offer of eschatological reward in the Adamic covenant of works should be considered a “voluntary” or “gracious.”
First Witsius, then Heidegger.
Herman Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, vol. 1, translation by Crookshank (Escondido, CA: The den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1990), pp. 76-82.
This therefore is settled; God promised to Adam eternal life. But here it may be and is usually asked whence this promise flows, whether from the mere good pleasure of the divine will, so that God would have acted nowise unworthy of himself, had he made no such promise to man: or, whether God’s making the covenant with man in this manner was from the divine nature, and from what was suitable to it? …
And first, I lay this down as an acknowledged truth, that God owes nothing to his creature. By no claim, no law is he bound to reward it … But as this goodness is natural to God, no less than holiness and justice; and equally becoming God to act, agreeably to his goodness, with a holy and innocent creature; so, from this consideration of the divine goodness, I imagine the following things may be very plainly inferred.
1st. That it is unbecoming the goodness, I had almost ventured to add, and the justice of God, to adjudge an innocent creature to hell torments …
2dly. Nor can God on account of his goodness, refuse to communicate himself to, or give the enjoyment of himself to, an innocent, an holy creature, or to love and favour it, in the most tender manner, while it has a being, and continues pure according to its condition. For, a holy creature is God’s very image. But God loves himself in the most ardent manner, as being the chief good: which he would not be, unless he loved himself above all. It therefore follows, he must also love his own image, in which he has expressed, to the life, himself, and what is most amiable in him, his own holiness …
Further, God does not love in vain. It is the character of a lover, to wish well to, and to do all the good in his power to the object of his love. But in the good will of God, consists both the soul’s life and welfare. And as nothing can hinder his actually doing well by those whom he wishes well to: it follows, that a holy creature, which he necessarily loves from the goodness of his nature, must also enjoy the fruits and effects of that divine love.
Besides, it is the nature of love to seek union and communion with the beloved. He does not love in reality, who desires not to communicate himself to the object of his affection. But, every one communicates himself such as he is. God, therefore, being undoubtedly happy, makes the creature, whom he loves and honours with the communion of himself, a partaker of his happiness …
The same thing may be demonstrated in another manner, and if I mistake not, incontestably as follows: The sum of the divine commands is thus: “Love me above all things; that is, look upon me as thy only chief good; hunger and thirst after me; place the whole of thy happiness in me alone; seek me above all, and nothing besides me, but so far as it has a relation to me.” But how is it conceivable, that God should thus speak to the soul, and the soul should religiously attend to, and diligently perform this, and yet never enjoy God? Is it becoming the most holy and excellent Being, to say to his pure unspotted creature, (such as we now suppose it), “Look upon me as thy chief good; but know, I neither am nor ever shall be such to thee. Long after me, but on condition [of] never obtaining thy desire; hunger and thirst after me, but only to be forever disappointed, and never satisfied; seek me above all things, but seek me in vain, who am never to be found”? He does not know God, who can image that such things are worthy of him …
Whence I infer, that God cannot, consistent with his goodness, refuse to grant to his holy creature the communion of himself …
Besides, as God himself has created the most intense desire of eternity in the soul, and at the same time, has commanded it to be carried out towards himself, as its eternal good, is it becoming God to frustrate such a desire, commanded and excited by God himself?
Johannes Heidegger, quoted in Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p. 296.
The further question now arises as to the source from which flows the promise mentioned of eternal and heavenly life for man, if he fulfills the law. Is it of the sheer eudokia and judgment (arbitrium) of the divine will, or of theoprepeia of the virtues proper to God’s nature, such as principally His goodness and holiness? Those who affirm the former rely on the principle that God is free either to present the innocent creature with life or to annihilate, punish, torture it eternally. This is the hypothesis of most Scholastics. Our view then must clearly be that it becomes God to return the love of the creature who loves Him, and that since a loving God cannot not wish and do well to one beloved, He must give and impart Himself entire to be enjoyed. Love is an affect of conjunction; as proceeding from Himself, God cannot fail to approve it as good or to desert it as bad.
Mike Brown
08. Oct, 2009
Add to those quotes of Witsius and Heidegger these by Samuel Petto (c.1624-1711) from his Difference Between the Old and New Covenants (1674):
On grace before the fall:
“It must, therefore, be said, it was not Gospel grace, or faith in a Mediator that was found in the Covenant of Works” (15).
On Adam’s meritorious reward for his obedience in the CoW:
“Adam perfectly obeying, the Lord in justice would be obliged to afford what he had promised.” (157)
And here:
“They merit ex pacto, by some contract or Covenant: that though the works be inconsiderable in value, to the reward, yet the Lord hath promised such a reward to them: thus and no otherwise, could the obedience of Adam in a state of innocency be meritorious, for he did owe all as duty to God, even by right of creation; he might have required all, without ingaging himself to give any reward; and finite services could not merit in worth and value an infinite reward; but the Lord promised it to his perfect unsinning works…Thus a reward may be of merit and of debt.” (220-21)
For Petto, once God established this covenant through his divine condescension, Adam had a legal claim and right to its reward upon the fulfillment of its conditions. This claim was not the result of an intrinsic merit, but a covenantally determined merit.
FWIW, I don’t think Petto’s view on this point stands in opposition to Owen’s either. They both seems to embrace a view of covenantally determined merit that stood over and and against the concept of merit developed in medieval scholastic theology, which taught that fallen man could respond to God’s grace with, as Muller says, “an act representative of and flowing from the minimal good that was in him, not a truly good act, but a bare turning toward the divine, a meritum de congruo.”
Mark, I don’t see how you think that Kline is deviating from this by wanting to be more strict in his language. He is simply making the point (as many RO did) that the covenant of works did not have grace or mercy as its foundation. I know you didn’t study under Kline, Mark, but have you read Kingdom Prologue carefully?
Also, as for Trueman’s thoughts on the RO’s use of “grace,” he says this in John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man:
“while the Reformed Orthodox will routinely use language of grace when referring to this condescension, this is to be understood not in a redemptive sense, for there could be no redemption where there is nothing to be redeemed before the Fall, but simply as underlying God’s freedom in the establishment of the covenant.” (74)
Cheers,
Mike
Rowland Ward
08. Oct, 2009
Hi Lee,
The Witsius quote is actually one of my favourites which I quote in my God and Adam page 121. But I’m not seeing it as supporting a Klinean view of merit.
Mark Jones
08. Oct, 2009
Mike,
I don’t suppose I have read Kline as carefully as you have. But, just like I don’t think his view of republication is the same as that of the 17thC, I also feel that his concept of merit is something different. But, right now, I don’t have any time to get into an extended discussion of this, unfortunately,
Blessings,
Mark
JB
09. Oct, 2009
Anyone have any idea where Kline would take exceptions to the WCF? Lee said above that he thinks WCF 7:1 would be a place (the part about voluntary condescension). Is there anywhere else?
Ligon Duncan
10. Oct, 2009
Patrick and Mark (if I may):
My main point in the article “Objections to the Covenant Theology of the Confession” in “The Westminster Confession into the 21st Century,” vol 3:467-500 is to defend the idea of the covenant of works from (especially) mono-covenantal criticisms. On the matter of “grace” in the CoW, I would say: “it depends on what you mean.” No reference from the Protestant Orthodox theologians can support what mono-covenantalists mean by “grace” in the CoW. Rowland will appreciate fully what I mean by that. He understands the logic and the hisotry of the CoW better than most. Now, as to whether my article is “good, bad or ugly” I’ll leave that to you to decide!
Cordially,
Ligon Duncan
Mark Jones
11. Oct, 2009
Ligon (also, if I may),
I agree; it depends on what you mean. I have no problem with the language of Francis Roberts who speaks of “mere grace”, just as I have no problem with Goodwin’s “creation dues”. Both fit nicely, I think. And, of course, I’ll have to read your work, which I am sure wont be either bad or ugly.
mark