I agree; it depends on what you mean. I have no problem with the language of Francis Roberts who speaks of “mere grace”, just as I have no problem with Goodwin’s “creation dues”. Both fit nicely, I think. And, of course, I’ll have to read your work, which I am sure wont be either bad or ugly.

mark

My main point in the article “Objections to the Covenant Theology of the Confession” in “The Westminster Confession into the 21st Century,” vol 3:467-500 is to defend the idea of the covenant of works from (especially) mono-covenantal criticisms. On the matter of “grace” in the CoW, I would say: “it depends on what you mean.” No reference from the Protestant Orthodox theologians can support what mono-covenantalists mean by “grace” in the CoW. Rowland will appreciate fully what I mean by that. He understands the logic and the hisotry of the CoW better than most. Now, as to whether my article is “good, bad or ugly” I’ll leave that to you to decide!

Cordially,

Ligon Duncan

I don’t suppose I have read Kline as carefully as you have. But, just like I don’t think his view of republication is the same as that of the 17thC, I also feel that his concept of merit is something different. But, right now, I don’t have any time to get into an extended discussion of this, unfortunately,

Blessings,
Mark

The Witsius quote is actually one of my favourites which I quote in my God and Adam page 121. But I’m not seeing it as supporting a Klinean view of merit.

On grace before the fall:

“It must, therefore, be said, it was not Gospel grace, or faith in a Mediator that was found in the Covenant of Works” (15).

On Adam’s meritorious reward for his obedience in the CoW:

“Adam perfectly obeying, the Lord in justice would be obliged to afford what he had promised.” (157)

And here:

“They merit ex pacto, by some contract or Covenant: that though the works be inconsiderable in value, to the reward, yet the Lord hath promised such a reward to them: thus and no otherwise, could the obedience of Adam in a state of innocency be meritorious, for he did owe all as duty to God, even by right of creation; he might have required all, without ingaging himself to give any reward; and finite services could not merit in worth and value an infinite reward; but the Lord promised it to his perfect unsinning works…Thus a reward may be of merit and of debt.” (220-21)

For Petto, once God established this covenant through his divine condescension, Adam had a legal claim and right to its reward upon the fulfillment of its conditions. This claim was not the result of an intrinsic merit, but a covenantally determined merit.

FWIW, I don’t think Petto’s view on this point stands in opposition to Owen’s either. They both seems to embrace a view of covenantally determined merit that stood over and and against the concept of merit developed in medieval scholastic theology, which taught that fallen man could respond to God’s grace with, as Muller says, “an act representative of and flowing from the minimal good that was in him, not a truly good act, but a bare turning toward the divine, a meritum de congruo.”

Mark, I don’t see how you think that Kline is deviating from this by wanting to be more strict in his language. He is simply making the point (as many RO did) that the covenant of works did not have grace or mercy as its foundation. I know you didn’t study under Kline, Mark, but have you read Kingdom Prologue carefully?

Also, as for Trueman’s thoughts on the RO’s use of “grace,” he says this in John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man:

“while the Reformed Orthodox will routinely use language of grace when referring to this condescension, this is to be understood not in a redemptive sense, for there could be no redemption where there is nothing to be redeemed before the Fall, but simply as underlying God’s freedom in the establishment of the covenant.” (74)

Cheers,
Mike

First Witsius, then Heidegger.

Herman Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, vol. 1, translation by Crookshank (Escondido, CA: The den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1990), pp. 76-82.

This therefore is settled; God promised to Adam eternal life. But here it may be and is usually asked whence this promise flows, whether from the mere good pleasure of the divine will, so that God would have acted nowise unworthy of himself, had he made no such promise to man: or, whether God’s making the covenant with man in this manner was from the divine nature, and from what was suitable to it? …

And first, I lay this down as an acknowledged truth, that God owes nothing to his creature. By no claim, no law is he bound to reward it … But as this goodness is natural to God, no less than holiness and justice; and equally becoming God to act, agreeably to his goodness, with a holy and innocent creature; so, from this consideration of the divine goodness, I imagine the following things may be very plainly inferred.

1st. That it is unbecoming the goodness, I had almost ventured to add, and the justice of God, to adjudge an innocent creature to hell torments …

2dly. Nor can God on account of his goodness, refuse to communicate himself to, or give the enjoyment of himself to, an innocent, an holy creature, or to love and favour it, in the most tender manner, while it has a being, and continues pure according to its condition. For, a holy creature is God’s very image. But God loves himself in the most ardent manner, as being the chief good: which he would not be, unless he loved himself above all. It therefore follows, he must also love his own image, in which he has expressed, to the life, himself, and what is most amiable in him, his own holiness …

Further, God does not love in vain. It is the character of a lover, to wish well to, and to do all the good in his power to the object of his love. But in the good will of God, consists both the soul’s life and welfare. And as nothing can hinder his actually doing well by those whom he wishes well to: it follows, that a holy creature, which he necessarily loves from the goodness of his nature, must also enjoy the fruits and effects of that divine love.

Besides, it is the nature of love to seek union and communion with the beloved. He does not love in reality, who desires not to communicate himself to the object of his affection. But, every one communicates himself such as he is. God, therefore, being undoubtedly happy, makes the creature, whom he loves and honours with the communion of himself, a partaker of his happiness …

The same thing may be demonstrated in another manner, and if I mistake not, incontestably as follows: The sum of the divine commands is thus: “Love me above all things; that is, look upon me as thy only chief good; hunger and thirst after me; place the whole of thy happiness in me alone; seek me above all, and nothing besides me, but so far as it has a relation to me.” But how is it conceivable, that God should thus speak to the soul, and the soul should religiously attend to, and diligently perform this, and yet never enjoy God? Is it becoming the most holy and excellent Being, to say to his pure unspotted creature, (such as we now suppose it), “Look upon me as thy chief good; but know, I neither am nor ever shall be such to thee. Long after me, but on condition [of] never obtaining thy desire; hunger and thirst after me, but only to be forever disappointed, and never satisfied; seek me above all things, but seek me in vain, who am never to be found”? He does not know God, who can image that such things are worthy of him …

Whence I infer, that God cannot, consistent with his goodness, refuse to grant to his holy creature the communion of himself …

Besides, as God himself has created the most intense desire of eternity in the soul, and at the same time, has commanded it to be carried out towards himself, as its eternal good, is it becoming God to frustrate such a desire, commanded and excited by God himself?

Johannes Heidegger, quoted in Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p. 296.

The further question now arises as to the source from which flows the promise mentioned of eternal and heavenly life for man, if he fulfills the law. Is it of the sheer eudokia and judgment (arbitrium) of the divine will, or of theoprepeia of the virtues proper to God’s nature, such as principally His goodness and holiness? Those who affirm the former rely on the principle that God is free either to present the innocent creature with life or to annihilate, punish, torture it eternally. This is the hypothesis of most Scholastics. Our view then must clearly be that it becomes God to return the love of the creature who loves Him, and that since a loving God cannot not wish and do well to one beloved, He must give and impart Himself entire to be enjoyed. Love is an affect of conjunction; as proceeding from Himself, God cannot fail to approve it as good or to desert it as bad.

I’m in Holland right now (can’t write much) and discussed this last night with Willem van Asselt. He is surprised by Kline’s view, as I suspect most Post-Reformation scholars would be.

The big issue is Kline’s redefinition of concepts such as grace and merit. I simply don’t think you can equate Kline with Witsius; Kline is sui generis. But, then again, I don’t think Kline’s form of republication is at all the same as the type (pardon the pun) you find in the 17thC.

If Kline’s move was to highlight the clarity of gospel truth I don’t see why his formulations/redefinitions were all that necessary.

Cheers,
Mark

Covenant theology had developed its main lines by the 1640s but there were differences of approach and the WCF is not itself fully consistent. It would be another generation before greater maturity in formulation, and even today there is no reason to nthink we can’t secure better insight.

I’ve certainly not read Witsius as if he were in effect Kilinean in respect to merit in the CoW. Can you elaborate?

“The logic of the Confession’s opening statement on the covenants contains more than a faint echo of the medieval via moderna. In his effort to determine the scholastic roots and precursors of the Reformed covenant theology Stephen Strehle confirms this connection. He concludes that the Reformed were deeply influenced by Franciscan voluntarism and its attendant pactum theology … Although we are grateful to our Reformed forefathers for the overall covenant scheme they have bequeathed to us, we must ask ourselves whether some of the details of that scheme may have come from a polluted source. Have we gone far enough in our covenantal thinking? Or do we still harbor ontological presuppositions regarding justice and merit? Is the distinction between condign and congruous merit helpful? Is it legitimate to take a distinction, which in its original formulation was part and parcel of the Semi-Pelagian drift of the late medieval church, and apply it to pre-fall covenantal arrangements?” (“Redefining Merit,” in the Festschrift for Meredith Kline, pp. 261-62).

I think when read in context is clear that “the polluted source” I am referring to is not Reformed theology but late medieval Semi-Pelagian pactum theology.

Also, I would like to add that I have always acknowledged that the mainstream Reformed tradition has been to see an element of grace and voluntary condescension in the pre-fall covenant of works. I freely grant that Kline’s view is in the minority (held by only a few, such as Witsius and Heidegger). For this reason, I would never argue that those who hold the gracious view are outside the pale or should be denied ordination.

After all, it is those of us who hold Kline’s view who must take exception to WCF VII.1 (“voluntary condescension”), not the other way around.

By the same token, I do think Kline’s view does a better job of bringing clarity to the Adam-Christ typology and showing the parallelism between the merit of Adam and the merit of Christ. Kline’s entire motive was to highlight the clarity of the gospel truth that we are saved by the merit of Christ as the second Adam. Why, then, is it so strongly railed against?